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ABSTRACT 
Forensic readiness of business information systems can support future forensics 
investigation or auditing on external/internal attacks, internal sabotage and 
espionage, and business fraud. To establish forensics readiness, it is essential for an 
organization to identify which fingerprints are relevant and where they can be 
located, to determine whether they are logged in a forensically sound way and 
whether all the needed fingerprints are available to reconstruct the events 
successfully. Also, a fingerprint identification and locating mechanism should be 
provided to guide potential forensics investigation in the future. Furthermore, 
mechanisms should be established to automate the security incident tracking and 
reconstruction processes. In this research, external and internal attacks are first 
modeled as augmented attack trees based on the vulnerabilities of business 
information systems. Then, modeled attacks are conducted against a honeynet that 
simulates an online business information system, and a forensic investigation 
follows each attack. Finally, an evidence tree, which is expected to provide the 
necessary contextual information to automate the attack tracking and reconstruction 
process in the future, is built for each attack based on fingerprints identified and 
located within the system.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
With continuing advances in internet technology, information systems have played 
more and more important roles in moving businesses toward online practices (De 
Aalst, Van Hee, Van De Werf, Kumar, & Verdonk, 2009; Romney & Steinbart, 
2008).  Online business offers convenience and flexibility to customers, employees, 
and partners. With lower costs than traditional methods, this method provides a 
highly profitable channel for businesses (Romney & Steinbart, 2008). However, 
due to the untrustworthy nature of the internet environment and the sophisticated 
business processes involved, online businesses also face severe security challenges. 
Over the past few years, millions of sensitive data records have been compromised 
(Ramzan, 2008; RSA Security, 2008) and a large number of frauds have been 
committed (Gu, Liang, & Wang, 2005; Larson, 2008; Lendez & Korevec, 1999; 
Singleton, Singleton, Bologna, & Lindquist, 2006). For a business, these security 
breaches not only result in substantial financial and operational losses, but also 
greatly hurt the confidence of customers, business partners and stakeholders 
(Hoffman, 2007; Seltxer, 2006). TITt is evident that cyber crime and fraudulent 
activity against online businesses will continue to thrive (Ramzan, 2008; Robb, 
2008; RSA Security, 2008; Zhang & Guan, 2008). TMeanwhile, over the last decade, 
government and industry bodies around the world have issued manyT laws and 
regulations to ensure the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of business data 
and the IT infrastructures.  These mandates place a lot of pressure on businesses 
and organizations to implement programs to ensure compliance with laws and 
regulations. Therefore, securing data and IT infrastructures is critical to online 
business and should be addressed appropriately.  
Many intrusion/fraud prevention, detection, and tolerance mechanisms have been 
deployed by organizations and companies doing online business in order to secure 
their IT infrastructures and the sensitive data stored in information systems (Fratto, 
2008; RSA Security, 2008; Williamson, 2006). However, the number of data 
breach incidents has still risen over the past few years (CENZIC, 2008; RSA 
Security, 2008). It is evident that even with the state-of-the-art security prevention, 
detection, and tolerance mechanisms, the risks to online business cannot be 
completely excluded. Consequently, intrusion/fraud deterrence, such as digital 
forensics investigation, has been recognized as a complement to traditional security 
protection techniques and provides another dimension of protection for the critical 
infrastructures of these vulnerable businesses (Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke, 2004; 
Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Straub, 1990; Valentine, 2007).  
Digital forensics is the process of investigating computer devices and associated 
storage media to determine whether they have been used to commit a crime and/or 
gain unauthorized access (Casey, 2011; Tan, 2001). Digital forensics involves the 
process of preservation, acquisition, analysis, discovery, documentation, and 
presentation of evidence (Casey, 2011). The success of digital forensics is highly 
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dependent on forensics readiness (Espiner, 2008; Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke, & 
Taylor, 2007; Tan, 2001; Valentine, 2007), e.g., the availability of forensically-
sound evidence that is able to stand up to legal scrutiny and that can be investigated 
in an efficient and effective way (Endicott-Popovsky et al., 2007; Tan, 2001). 
Forensic readiness is an increasingly important topic in forensic investigation and 
information assurance research (Carrier & Spafford, 2003, 2004; Endicott-
Popovsky et al., 2007; Rowlinson, 2004; Tan, 2001; Tang & Daniels, 2005; Wilson 
& Wolfe, 2003; Yasinsac & Manzano, 2001). Existing research efforts focus on the 
organization-level framework design for forensics readiness, such as policy design, 
implementation, and management. However, they did not address the investigation 
of security incidents in information systems (Poolsapassit & Ray, 2007).  
The overall goal of this research is to provide technical guidance to effectively and 
efficiently investigate security incidents that take place in online business 
information systems. However, there are a few challenges that need to be 
addressed. First, the fingerprints left by attacks in information systems remain 
unclear to digital forensics and security professionals, and the fingerprints that are 
needed to reconstruct the corresponding attack incidents should be determined 
(Poolsapassit & Ray, 2007). Second, many attacks and frauds remain undetected 
due to the lack of sophisticated detection mechanisms (Espiner, 2008; Endicott-
Popovsky et al., 2007; Valentine, 2007). Third, many forensics investigations are 
not conducted due to the cost of identifying, locating, and processing the vast 
amount of the information in the system (Jeyaraman & Atallah, 2006; Endicott-
Popovsky et al., 2007; Tan, 2001; Valentine, 2007). This research effort addresses 
the first challenge and provides foundations to address the other two challenges in 
digital forensics investigation. A systematic approach will be developed to identify 
and locate the fingerprints that are needed to reconstruct the attacks studied. An 
evidence model will be developed based on the indentified fingerprints for each 
attack. Evidence models can be used to guide forensics investigation in the future 
and to provide the contextual information that is needed for the automation of 
security incident tracking and investigation.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner: System modeling 
and Methodology are described in Section 2. Attack generation and evidence 
acquisition processes are presented in Section 3. Results analysis and evidence tree 
building process are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses how to utilize the 
fingerprints located to identify and reconstruct attacks. Section 6 gives a brief 
literature review and Section 7 states the conclusion of the paper. 
 
2.  SYSTEM MODELING AND METHODOLOGY 
The overview of the research methodology is shown in Figure 1. Throughout this 
research, threats and attacks will be modeled as augmented attack trees for online 
business information systems (Mauw & Oostdijk, 2005; Poolsapassit & Ray, 2007; 
Saini, Duan, & Paruchuri, 2008; Schneier, 1999). Attacks are then conducted 
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against an online business information system that is simulated by a honeynet. 
Forensics investigation will be conducted following each attack and fingerprints 
are identified, located, and manually reconstructed to determine whether the attack 
itself can be reconstructed. If the attack or fraud cannot be reconstructed 
successfully, the attacking and forensics investigation process will be repeated with 
enhanced evidence logging. If the attack or fraud is reconstructed successfully, the 
fingerprints of each attack operation will be identified. The metadata of the 
fingerprints of each attack operation, such as log name, format, location, 
timestamps, and security features, etc. are composed into nodes, which become 
child nodes of the leaf nodes in the augmented attack tree. This entire process will 
finally result in the creation of an evidence tree for each attack studied.   
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Figure 1 The overview of the research process on forensics readiness 
2.1 Threat Modeling and Attack Generation 
The attack tree approach that is first proposed by Schneier (1999) is used to 
systematically analyze security threats. Attacks are modeled and represented by a 
tree structure where the root node represents the final goal, other interior nodes 
represent subgoals, and leaf nodes are attacking approaches to achieve the final goal 
(Poolsapassit & Ray, 2007). Children of a node in the tree can be one of the two 
logical types: AND and OR. To reach the goal, all of its AND children, or at least 
one of its OR children, must be accomplished. Attack trees grow incrementally by 
time and they capture knowledge in a reusable form. First, possible attack goals 
must be identified. Each attack goal becomes the root of its own attack tree. 
Construction continues by considering all possible attacks against the given goal. 
These attacks form the AND and OR children of the goal. Next, each of these attacks 
becomes a goal and their children are generated.  Figure 2 shows an example of an 
attack tree of the inside threat, “achieving the root privilege”. In such an attack, the 
attacker is a regular user and has a lower access privilege to the target (which needs 
root privilege), and conducts a series of attacking operations to achieve the root 
privilege as the system user. Note that links that are connected with a line represents 
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the “AND” relationship among the states or sub-goals, which are working together 
to achieve the same parent goal. 
External threats are modeled using attack trees and attacks are then further 
modeled as augmented attack trees (Poolsapassit & Ray, 2007). An augmented 
attack tree is built from the attack tree by including the attack operations as child 
nodes to the leaf nodes of the original attack tree. To ensure the coverage of 
external threats, a two dimension table (shown in Table 1) is used to enumerate 
all potential threats. A row of the table represents a vulnerability of the honeynet 
identified at the previous step, and a column of the table represents a type of 
external threat classified using the Microsoft STRIDE model (Swiderski & Snyder, 
2004), i.e., denial of service, repudiation, information disclosure, spoofing, 
tampering, and elevation of privilege.  
Figure 2 An attack tree of an internal threat “achieving the root privilege” 
 
Table 1 The enumeration table for external threats of the honeynet 
system 
vulnerabilities 
spoofing tampering DOS repudiation 
information 
disclosure 
Privilege 
escalation 
IIS     X X 
ftp   X    
…       
 
Internal threats include espionage, sabotage, and privilege or resource abuse. 
Insiders usually have a pre-defined goal and target (Cappelli & Trzeciak, 2008); for 
example, accessing or copying sensitive information, destructing critical services, 
degrading the security configuration of the system. To reach the targets, insiders 
need to have known or unknown paths (Cappelli & Trzeciak, 2008), such as 
appropriate access privilege, privilege escalation to achieve appropriate access, or 
exploiting vulnerabilities to crash critical services. To conduct internal attacks, 
insiders may or may not need to access the target, they may or may not have the 
appropriate access privilege in advance, or they may or may not need to exploit 
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system vulnerabilities. Therefore, the threat modeling techniques proposed for 
external threats might not be sufficient for internal threat modeling. In this research, 
internal threats are first enumerated based on both attack targets and access paths 
as shown in Table 2. Two categories of internal threats are considered here. Case 
One, the insider conducts an attack to destroy valuable assets or escalate the 
privilege to access sensitive assets; and Case Two, the insider accesses sensitive 
assets with desired privilege for industry espionage purposes.  In this paper, Case 
One internal threats and attacks will be systematically analyzed and modeled using 
attack trees and augmented attack trees, similar to the external threats and attack 
modeling described above. Case Two internal threats are first enumerated and 
modeled through the identification of access paths such as USB, email, and CD 
ROM, etc., then they are identified through the linking between the access paths 
and access target. They are then modeled using attack trees, similar to those for 
external attacks. 
Table 2 the enumeration table for internal threats of the honeynet 
target 
no access 
privilege 
privilege 
escalation 
crash services 
email services X X  
web services X X  
… X X  
sensitive assets 1 X X  
… X X  
vulnerabilities 1  X X 
…  X X 
2.2 A Honeynet Simulating an Online Business Information System 
The system designed for this research is a third generation Honeynet, as shown in 
Figure 3. It consists of two major parts: a set of honeypots and a single honeywall 
controlling the entire honeynet. The honeypots simulate some of the necessary 
functioning components of the online business, e.g. a web server, a file server, a 
printing server, an email server, and an open source business information system, 
such as the CeBuSoft Accounting Information System 1.01 (CeBuSoft, 2013). The 
honeywall acts like an invisible bridge between the honeypots and the outside 
world, and it can intercept all traffic between the honeynet and the outside.  The 
honeynet uses a public IP address that is reserved specifically for this research and 
it becomes part of the DSU campus network and is controlled by the boarder router 
outside of the DSU firewalls intended to attract external attacks. For the research 
described in this paper, the attacks and forensics examination will mainly involve 
two windows honeypots. 
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Figure 3 The honeynet that simulates the online business information systems 
The honeypots run copies of Microsoft Windows XP with Service Pack 2 x86 
without patches. They are, however, installed with the Sebek kernel module 
downloaded from the Honeynet Project (2013). This module allows activity 
monitoring on the honeypots, such as console command logging, without 
compromising the honeypot by providing clues that would tip off a potential 
attacker. The honeypots are connected to a Linksys eight port switch alongside the 
honeywall's eth1 interface. The honeywall computer is connected to a wall port and, 
from there, a cable modem on eth0. To capture and analyze traffic, the honeywall 
computer is installed with Roo, which is a Honeynet Project Linux distribution to 
provide a set of tools for an administrator to manage the network.  One of these 
tools is the web interface called walleye, which can be used to both change the 
configuration of the honeywall as well as analyze the data that passes through it.  
The minimal requirements for honeywall CDROM are: Intel x_86 Pentium class 
CPU, 512MB Memory, Minimum 10GB HDD and 2 network interface cards (3 if 
you want to use the remote management).  The default configuration of the network 
interface cards was used. Therefore,  eth0 was connected to the wall port which was 
in turn connected to a cable modem and Eth1 was connected to a Linksys eight port 
switch which was further connected to the two honeypots. The honeywall 
transparently logs all communications between its eth0 and eth1 interfaces as well 
as all Sebek traffic from the honeypot computers. Also, it can provide traffic and 
honeypot information to the honeynet administrator through the Walleye web 
interface, which allows the administrator to change honeywall settings and to 
review logged communications. Connections can be sorted by date, originator, 
recipient, and service. Traffic is also downloadable in the form of PCAP files. 
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3.  THE ATTACKS AND FINGERPRINTS ACQUISITION 
We simulate external attacks and internal attacks against online business in the 
following way: external attacks are executed from a computer outside of the 
honeynet without knowledge of the system security credentials, such as an account 
password. Internal attacks are executed on one of the honeypots locally or remotely 
through a machine that is remotely logged in the honeynet. In this paper, a few 
attacks will be conducted against the honeynet, including two external attacks, two 
Case One internal attacks, and two Case Two internal attacks. Before each attack, 
the system is restored using the image of the original system. After each attack is 
conducted, the affected honeypot is powered down and the hard disk is taken out 
and put into a write blocker, which is connected to a USB port of the laptop 
computer with a Backtrack 4 live DVD. A forensic sound image is obtained through 
the use of Backtrack 4 live DVD’s dcfldd program to make a bit-for-bit copy of the 
/dev/hda1 device. Note that volatile fingerprints in memory were not collected.  
Backtrack 4 live DVD is a well known, free ethical hacking tool that can provide 
great flexibility and well-developed exploits to users, making the attacking jobs 
much easier.   
3.1 ATTACKS GENERATION 
Two external denial of service attacks are conducted as described below. 
Attack A is a Denial of Service attack targeting the Filezilla administrator user 
interface. The attack is accomplished by sending an excessively long USER 
command to the FTP Server that runs the Administration Interface (FileZilla Server 
Interface.exe). After the stack is overwritten by the long string, an exception is 
generated. The attack is launched using Metasploit’s exploit 
“auxiliary/dos/windows/ftp/filezilla_amin_user”.  Once the attack is completed, the 
victim computer is locked until the administration interface is forced to shut down. 
The modeled attack tree is described in Figures 4 (a) and (b). Note that a successful 
attack is composed of only a part of the attack tree. 
Attack B is a denial of service targeting the FTP Server’s vulnerable PORT 
Command. The attack is launched using Metasploit’s exploit 
“auxiliary/dos/windows/ftp/filezilla_server_port”.  This attack works by sending a 
malformed “PORT” command combined with a “LIST” command. To execute this 
command, the server attempts to write to a NULL pointer, which will generate an 
exception.  Once this attack is successfully executed, no client can connect to the 
server. 
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Figure 4(a) The left part of the attack tree specific to Attack A and Attack B 
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Figure 4 (b) The right part of the attack tree specific to Attack A and Attack B 
Two Case One internal attacks are conducted as described below. 
Attack C involves manual privilege escalation using the Windows’ command line 
and Windows Task Scheduler’s scheduling service. The attack can be 
accomplished by login as a regular user on the system.  In this research, the default 
user account created during the Windows installation process is actually chosen 
here. Then, the cmd.exe process is lunched from the run box. Once the Command 
Prompt is active, the command “at XX:YY /interactive cmd.exe” is typed (XX:YY 
defines the time when the cmd.exe process should be launched, and it is calculated 
by taking the current time plus the specified length of the time period in minutes). 
After such period of time passed, the Windows Task Scheduler creates an instance 
of cmd.exe process in interactive mode, causing a new command prompt window 
to appear on the screen. This command prompt window runs as the Local System 
User and has the title “C:\WINDOWS\svchost.exe”. Then, having access to a 
command prompt running with higher permissions, the explorer.exe process will 
be shut down. Once the explorer.exe process is successfully shut down, the 
command “cd ..” is typed into the new system-level command prompt, followed by 
the command “start explorer.exe”. This will launch the explorer.exe process with 
the privileges of a system user.  The attack operations are shown by the internal 
nodes of the evidence tree presented in Figure 7.  
Attack D is accomplished in a more sophisticated manner. The attacking machine 
is a Dell Latitude D810 laptop computer, running Ubuntu 9.10, Karmic Koala, 
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connected to a wireless network that is part of the honeynet. The attack is conducted 
using Metasploit’s (version 3.4.2-dev [core:3.4 API:1.0] exploit 
“windows/browser/ms10_002_aurora”, a server-based Internet Explorer memory 
corruption attack, and the payload “windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp”, a reflective 
injection attack that runs the meterpreter service on the target machine. Once the 
exploit is running, the attacker simply needs to navigate to the malicious page, the 
browser freezes, and a successful intrusion is accomplished. The next step involves 
connecting and gaining system user access from the external computer. Once the 
meterpreter service is connected to the malicious computer from the target 
computer, its session could be opened with the command “sessions -i 1”. The actual 
privilege escalation is achieved by using the priv, which is a “privilege” meterpreter 
extension. One simply needs to load it with “use priv”, and then use a named pipe 
impersonation attack by “getsystem -t 1”. After this is accomplished, the server 
process is running with system user permissions and the privilege escalation is 
successfully accomplished. The attack operations are shown by the internal nodes 
of the evidence tree presented in Figure 8. 
Two Case Two internal attacks are conducted as described below, both of which 
utilize removable media (USB drive and CD-ROM) as the access path to steal 
sensitive business information. 
Case Two Internal Attack E is a typical industrial espionage inside attack. In such 
an attack, the attacker has all the needed privileges to access sensitive data and to 
access the USB ports which are required to perform the user’s duty. However, those 
sensitive data should not be copied to personal USB devices since this may result 
in potential information leakage. To perform such an attack, the user is logged into 
system with all needed privileges, navigate to sensitive data, copy and paste the 
sensitive data into the USB device.  The USB device is then removed and the user 
is logged out of the system later. The attack is shown in Figure 5.  
Case Two Internal Attack F is a typical industrial espionage inside attack, similar 
to Attack E described above. In such an attack, the attacker has all the needed 
privileges to access sensitive data and to access the CD-ROM Drive, which is 
needed to perform the user’s duty. However, those sensitive data should not be 
copied to CD-ROM since this may result in potential information leakage. To 
perform such an attack, the user can log into system with all needed privileges and 
navigate to sensitive data, and then burns the sensitive data onto a CD-ROM.  The 
CD-ROM is then removed and the user is logged out of the system. The attack is 
shown in Figure 6. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(4) 
 
84 
Log On As 
Priviledged User
Copy Files 
To Device
Navigate to 
Files
Insert USB
Copy Sensitive 
Information to USB
AND
 
 
Log On As 
Priviledged User
Copy Files 
To Disk
Navigate to 
Files
Insert CD-ROM
Copy Sensitive 
Information to CD-ROM
AND
 
 
Figure 5 Case Two Internal Attack 
E (USB copy) 
Figure 6 Case Two Internal Attack 
F (CD-Rom copy attack) 
 
3.2 FINGERPRINT ACQUISITION 
Fingerprints are retrieved from three sources in the honeynet. The first source is the 
hard disk of the compromised honeypots. After each attack was successfully 
conducted, a bit-by-bit copy of the compromised honeypot hard disk is created 
using the dcfldd program from the Backtrack toolkit. Then, AccessData's Forensic 
Toolkit FTK is used to process the image of hard disk. The disk index feature has 
the ability to search every fingerprint item whether it is recognized by the file 
system or not (Note that other forensic fingerprint processing tools can also provide 
a similar index feature). This index feature can greatly improve the efficiency of 
searching for fingerprints relevant to the attack. For example, for Attack D, FTK 
can search the disk image for all items with the IP address of the hostile server in a 
few seconds since all related fingerprints are indexed. For Attack C, FTK can 
search the disk image for all items with particular console command used. The 
second source of fingerprints is the logs maintained in the system such as the event 
log, the security event log, and Internet Explorer history entries, which can either 
be searched by using FTK or searched manually without using any tools since these 
types of fingerprints are easily readable within Windows. Once relevant events and 
history information are discovered, they are recorded into the augment attack tree 
to reconstruct the evidence tree for such modeled attack. Note that a piece of 
fingerprint is said to be relevant if, and only if, it is the fingerprint left by an 
operation of the attack studied. In the studied system, there are many other 
processes running, each of which will have different operations on the system. 
Therefore, they will leave significant amounts of fingerprints in the system. Since 
these processes are not part of the attack studied, the fingerprints they left are not 
relevant to the attack. Note that the second source of fingerprints can also be 
obtained from the forensics disk image. The third source of fingerprint is the 
honeywall’s records of incoming and outgoing connections. Note that not all 
fingerprints retrieved from honeywall are visible in a regular network without 
proper configuration. Using the Walleye web interface from the computer acting as 
the honeywall's management interface, it is easy to isolate the connections made 
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within the attack’s time frame and to review each connection to determine its 
relevance to the attack. Packets captured from each communication are made 
available in PCAP format by the web interface, and are downloaded and reviewed 
to ensure that the inferences made about the content of those communications are 
factual (not hidden, disguised, or modified). 
 
4.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The results of the two external DoS attacks (A and B) can be found in Table. 3. 
This table is composed of the fingerprints that are relevant to each of the two attacks 
and can be found in some important logs in the honeynet. The content of the log 
files can be either searched manually or searched by using FTK. 
External Attack A targeting the administration interface (described in Figure 4 (a) 
and (b) and section 3.1) yields rich fingerprints, most of which can be found in the 
Filezilla log file at the application level.  This particular attack works by sending 
four thousand user requests such that the length of a succeeding request is longer 
than the previous request. This makes the log file very difficult to read.  However, 
it does indicate the IP address where the requests originated as well as the time of 
the request.  In a denial of service attack, the attacker’s IP address is often the most 
valuable piece of fingerprint identified. This is because that once the attacker’s IP 
address is identified, a person can block that particular IP address (or a block of IP 
addresses) from connecting to the target server.  The event log also contains a 
security event with timestamps which records the time when the administrative 
interface crashed. The firewall log includes a record of the attacker’s IP address and 
the timestamps of the attack.  The firewall log has a larger file size than other logs, 
which makes it more difficult to locate fingerprints. The honeywall log contains 
similar information to the firewall log, but is much easier to read and locate. 
Table 3 fingerprints of the two external attacks in part of the important logs within the 
honeynet 
Types and Locations of Fingerprint 
  
Event 
log 
Firewall log Filezilla log Walleye 
Attacks A A,  B A, B A , B 
Time of the Attack 
logged 
A A , B A,  B A, B 
Logged IP of the attacker   A ,  B A, B A, B 
Protected from 
Tampering 
      A, B 
Attack B (described in Figure 4 (a), Figure. 4 (b), and section 3.1) is similar to 
Attack A, but it is much more difficult to identify the fingerprints of Attack B than 
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those of Attack A, since Attack B connects to the Filezilla sever only once per 
execution. The Filezilla log is able to log the connection causing the DoS attack, 
but there are too many connections to the Filezilla server from other legitimate 
users. Thus, it becomes very difficult to locate and identify the connection made by 
Attack B. Other relevant fingerprints can be found in similar locations as those of 
Attack A, except that the event log does not log any fingerprint for Attack B.  The 
firewall and the honeywall can successfully log the timestamps and IP address of 
the attacking computer of Attack B.  
The results of the two Case One internal attacks (Attack C and Attack D) can be 
found in Figures 7 and 8, each represents an evidence tree built based on the 
corresponding augmented attack tree. The goal of both attacks is to exploit 
vulnerabilities of the system in order to escalate from a regular user to the one with 
system user permissions. 
Become Root User
Escalate from less 
privileged user
Login as User(locally) Execute code as User
Logon as local user 
through windows graphical 
login
Security Event:
Successful Logon:
User Name: User
Domain: CAPITAL-
EE789F2
Logon ID: (0x0,0x284f4)
Logon Type: 2
Logon Process: Use32
Authentication Package: 
Negotiate
Workstation Name: 
CAPITAL-EE7B9F2
Logon GUID: {00000000-
0000-0000-
                         
000000000000}
Wait until event loads 
command prompt, 
terminate explorer.exe
Restart explorer.exe
> start explorer.exe
Add schedueled event:
> at[hh:mm] /interactive 
cmd.exe
Security Event:
Object Open
Object Server: Security
Object Type: File
Object Name:
C:\WINDOWS\Tasks\
At1.job
Handle ID: {0,7044624}
ProcessID:1052
Image File Name
C:\WINDOWS\system32\
svchost.exe
Primary User Name: 
CAPITAL-EE7B9F2S
Primary Domain: 
WORKGROUP
Primary Logon ID: 
(0x0,0x3Ee7)
Client User Name:-
Client Domain:-
Client Logon ID:-
Accesses: 
READ_CONTROL
                  SYNCHRONIZE
                  WriteData (or 
AddFile)
                  AppendData(or 
AddSSubdirectory
                                       or 
CreatePipeinstance)
                 WriteEA
                 ReadAttributes
                 WriteAttributes
Privilleges: -
Restricted Sid Count: 0
Security Event:
A new process has been 
cerated
New Process ID 1688
Image File Name
C:\WINDOWS|system32\
at.exe
Creator Process ID: 508
User name: User
Domain: CAPITAL-
EE7B9F2
Logon ID: (0x0,0xc5BD)
Security Event:
A process has exited:
Process ID: 388
Image File Name:
C:\WINDOWS\system32\
taskkill.exe
User Name: User
Domain: CAPITAL-
EE7B9F2
Logon ID: (0x0,0xc5BD)
Security Event:
A process has been 
created:
New Process ID: 388
Image File Name
C:\WINDOWS\system32\
taskkill.exe
Creator Process ID: 508
User Name: User
Domain: CAPITAL-
EE7B9F2
Logon ID: (0x0,0xc5BD)
Security Event:
A process has exited:
Process ID: 1476
Image File Name:
C:\WINDOWS\explorer.exe
User Name : User
Domain:CAPITAL-EE7B9F2
Logon ID: (0x0,0xC5BD)
Security Event:
A new process has been 
created:
New Process ID: 1668
Image File Name:
C:\WINDOWS\explorer.exe
Creator Process ID: 1464
User Name: CAPITAL-
EE7B9F2S
Domain: WORKGROUP
Login ID: (0x0,0x3E7)
 
Figure 7 A part of the evidence tree for Case One Internal Attack C 
Internal Attack C begins with a simple operation of logon as a regular user on the 
honeypot (workstation CAPITAL-EE7B9F2). In this case, the user was named as 
User. This operation generates a security event of type “Successful Logon” that is 
logged by the system's event log. The second operation generates a scheduled event 
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(to open an interactive command prompt) and two other events, e.g., the launch of 
a new instance of the process “C:\WINDOWS\system32\at.exe”, and the open of 
the file “C:\WINDOWS\Tasks\At1.job”, which is the job file that the scheduler 
would execute at the time when the execution command is entered (for example, to 
launch a cmd.exe process). The third operation is to terminate the process, 
“explorer.exe”, which generates three events to be logged by the security event log. 
The fingerprints of the three events can track the creation of an instance of the 
process “C:\WINDOWS\system32\taskkill.exe,” the termination of the explorer.exe 
process, and the termination of the Windows task manager. The final step is the 
restart of the explorer.exe process in a command prompt that was scheduled to be 
launched in a previous step. This operation creates another event logged by the 
security event log. The process, “C:\Windows\explorer.exe”, is created not by the 
user User but actually by the system user CAPITAL-EE7B9F2$. Note that the 
system user CAPITAL-EE7B9F2$ is also the user that is responsible for the Object 
Open action on At1.job and the launch of the cmd.exe process. The scheduling event 
itself (the one created by the operation that scheduled the task), however, is the 
property of User who is just a regular user. Thus, a line could be drawn between 
the actions of User and the subsequent actions of the system user CAPITAL-
EE7B9F2$. The fingerprints left by all of these operations are used to build the leaf 
nodes of the evidence tree for this attack (shown in Figure 7), which can be useful 
in locating relevant fingerprints as well as to automate the tracking and 
reconstruction of Attack C. 
Become Root User
Escalate from less 
privileged user
Login as User(locally) Execute code as User
Logon as local user through 
windows graphical login
Security Event:
Successful Logon:
User Name: Rose Lalonde
Domain: JOHN-F248EC4C4C
Logon ID: (0x0,0x21A24)
Logon Type: 2
Logon Process: Use32
Authentication Package: 
Negotiate
Workstation Name: JOHN-
F248EC4C4C
Logon GUID: {00000000-
0000-0000-000000000000}
Allow payload 
(meterpreter.reverse_tcp) 
to run, establish service, 
connect to external host
Use explorer.exe to 
connect to malicious (CVE-
2010-0249)
Packet Capture:
216.254.232.77 138.247.25.197
TCP 1073 (bridgecontrol) 1kB 12 pktsà 80 (http)
30 Windows ß 13kB 16 pkts --
Security Event:
A new process has been 
cerated
New Process ID 1688
Image File Name
C:\WINDOWS|system32\
at.exe
Creator Process ID: 508
User name: User
Domain: CAPITAL-EE7B9F2
Logon ID: (0x0,0xc5BD)
Login as User (Remotely)
Execute code through 
remote shell
Load meterpreter session 
from external machine 
Permissions escalate 
through named pipe 
impersonation
>getsystem -t 1
Packet Capture:
216.254.232.77 138.247.25.197
TCP 1073 (fastechnologlm) 11kB 341 pktsà 444 (snpp)
26 Windows ß 846kB 665 pkts --
System Event (Error):
Timeout (30000 Milliseconds)
waiting for the pqrons service to 
connect.
Security Event:
A process has been 
created:
Process ID: 300
Image File Name
C:\WINDOWS\system32\
cmd.exe
Creator Process ID: 704
User Name: JOHN-
F248EC4C4C
Domain: WORKGROUP
Logon ID: (0x0,0x3E7)
Security Event:
A process has exited:
Process ID: 300
Image File Name:
C:\WINDOWS\cmd.exe
User Name: JOHN-
F248EC4C4C
Domain: WORKGROUP
Logon ID: (0x0,0x3E7)
 
Figure 8 A part of the evidence tree for Case One Internal Attack D 
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Attack D is executed in much the same way as Attack C, with the login of the 
regular user Rose Lalonde on a different honeypot (workstation JOHN-
F245EC4C4C with an IP address of 2xx.xxx.xxx.x7). After login, the attacker 
attempts to visit the malicious site “HTUhttp://1xx.xxx.xx.xx7/exploitUTH”. This operation 
is recorded in Internet Explorer's history and can be found both in “C:\Documents 
and Settings\Rose Lalonde\Local Settings\Monday\1xx.xxx.xx.xx7” and in the 
index.dat file. This operation is also captured by honeywall's transparent bridge. 
During this communication, the honeypot machine sends 12 packets to the 
malicious site, and receives 16 packets from the malicious site. After the payload 
has been executed, the attacker reconnects to the malicious machine on port 444, 
on which the meterpreter process is running. Once the remote intrusion has been 
completed, privilege escalation is attempted. Fingerprints of the attack come in the 
form of a system event of type “Error,” warning of a timeout of 30 seconds while 
“waiting for the pqrons service to connect.” Subsequently, when the attacker opens 
a remote shell, a new instance of the command prompt, 
“C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe”, is created by user JOHN-F245EC4C4C$, which 
is the system user of the honeypot workstation. The fingerprints of this attack are 
logged by firewall logs and internet history, linking the user Rose Lalonde to the 
actions generated by JOHN-F245EC4C4C$. This is because the successful 
completion of this attack has to go through the communications between an 
external server and a local honeypot machine within the honeynet. The fingerprints 
left by all of these operations are used to build the evidence tree (shown in Figure 
8), which can be useful in locating relevant fingerprint as well as to automate the 
tracking and reconstruction of Attack D. 
The results of Attack E and Attack F are shown in Figures 9 and  10. Each figure 
contains an augmented threat tree that represents the vulnerability exploited, the 
steps needed to exploit it, the attacker's operations, and the fingerprint generated by 
those operations. The final goal of both attacks is to steal sensitive information from 
a business information system with desired system permissions. 
Operations conducted on a Windows machine may leave some forensic traces in 
the registry, some are persistent for a long time and some are volatile. If a piece of 
registry fingerprint is coupled with information from the event logs and file 
systems, the insider attack may be tracked and reconstructed. Based on our 
observation, relevant fingerprints can be located in machine’s System hive, 
Software hive, the user’s NTuser.dat hive, the setupapi.log that keeps a history of 
all devices installed via plug and play, and the Security event log.   
Attack E is a classic industrial espionage inside attack that is accomplished by 
copying sensitive data to a personal USB device.  The inside attack is conducted on 
7/29/2011. Based on information in the registry, at 1:03:39 AM, a Centon USB 
device with a serial number of 6AFA4AAD80 was attached to the machine. At 
1:04:34 AM, the attack was logged into the system and left fingerprints in the 
security event log.  Based on additional fingerprints in the registry, the USB device 
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with serial number 6AFA4AAD80 can be linked with the disk with driver letter E. 
Examining the RecentDocs registry key with the tool RegExtract shows that 
_USBSTOR.sql, Removable Disk (E:), _USB.sql, and a file named “highly 
sensitive things” which is flagged in the honeypot as a sensitive file, were recently 
accessed. At 1:14:44 AM, User synchronized the document titled with “highly 
sensitive things”, with the Removable Disk (E:).  All these fingerprints are shown 
in Figure 9. 
Log On
Copy Files To 
Device
Navigate to 
Files
Insert USB
Copy Sensitive 
Information to USB
AND
Timestamp: 7/29/2011  1:04:34 AM
Event Id: 528
Event Description: 
User DSU-HONEYPOT1 *Successful 
Logon
User Name: User
Domain:DSU-HONEYPOT1 LogonID:
RegExtract Plugin: Device Classes
Registry Hive: System Device 
Disk&Ven_CENTON
&Prod_DS_Pro&Rev_8.07
Serial 6DFA4AAD80
Last Write Time: Friday, July 29, 2011
(Fri) 01:03:39 (UTC-06:00) Central Time
(US & Canada)
RegExtract Plugin: Applets
Registry Hive: NT User
Key: Software Microsoft Windows
Current Version Applets Wordpad
Recent File List Last Write Time:
 Friday, July 29, 2011 (Fri) 01:14:35
 (UTC-06:00) Central Time (US & Canada)
File1: C: Documents and Settings User
My Documents highly sensitive things
RegExtract Plugin: RecentDocs
Registry Hive: NT User
Key: Software 
Microsoft Windows Current Version 
Explorer RecentDocs 1: Secret Files 
2 _USBSTOR.sql  3. Removable Disk (E: )
5:_USB.sql  6. Contents.txt  8. code
9. setup.inf  46: highly sensitive things
Timestamp: 7/29/2011  1:14:44 AM
Event Id: 560
Event Description:
*Object Open: Object Server:
Security Object Type: File Object Name
C: Documents and Settings User My 
Documents
highly sensitive things
Client Logon ID: Accesses: READ_CONTROL
SYNCHRONIZE ReadData (or ListDirectory)
ReadEA ReadAttributes
 
Figure 9 A part of the evidence tree for Case Two Internal Attack E 
Log On As 
Privileged User
Copy Files To 
Device
Navigate to 
Files
Insert CD-ROM
Copy Sensitive 
Information to CD-ROM
AND
Timestamp: 7/11/2011  5:48:26 AM
Event Id: 528
Event Description: Successful Logon
User Name: Worker 2
Domain:DSU-HONEYPOT1 
IDE Devices RegExtract Plugin
Registry Hive: System Timestamp: 
Mon Jul 11 5:41:35 2011
IDE Disk HDS728080PLA380
Mon Jul 11 5:41:34 2011
IDE CdROMHL-DT-ST_DVD
Timestamp: 7/11/2011  5:53:12 AM
User: Worker 2
Event Id: 568
Event Description: Object access
Application Data Microsoft Cd
Burning highly sensitive very 
sensitive.doc
Timestamp: 7/11/2011  5:53:34 AM
Event Id: 538
Event Description: User Logoff
User Name: Worker 2
Timestamp: 7/11/2011  5:53:12 AM
Event Id: 568
Event Description:
Hard Link creation attempt
User Name: Worker 2
Primary Domain:
DSU-HONEYPOT1
File name: C: Documents and Settings 
Worker 2 My Documents very 
sensitive.doc
 
Figure 10 A part of the evidence tree for Case Two Internal Attack F 
Attack F is a classic industrial espionage inside attack by copying sensitive data to 
a personal CD-ROM device. The inside attack is conducted on 7/29/2011. Based 
on fingerprints in the security event log, user Worker 2 logged into the system at 
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5:46: 26, and attempted to create a hard link with “highly sensitive very sensitive” 
at 5:53:12. Analysis of the IDE Device Class registry shows that a CD ROM was 
documented at 5:47:34, a minute after Worker 2 logged on to the system.  Finally, 
the user Worker 2 is found to burn the file “highly sensitive things” to the CD ROM 
at 5:53:12. All these fingerprints of Attack F can be found in Figure 10. 
 
5.  DISCUSSION 
Once fingerprints of each individual attack have been identified and located, an 
evidence tree can be built to guide the tracking and reconstruction of such attack. 
Take Attack C for example. The most sensitive operation of this attack is the start 
of the explore.exe process with the system user CAPITAL-EE7B9F2$’s privilege 
since such a process (explore.exe) is usually run by a regular user instead of the 
system user CAPITAL-EE7B9F2$. Once such an event is logged in the system and 
is identified by a monitoring agent, an alert can be issued to indicate that a privilege 
escalation attack may have been launched.  
Evidence trees are expected to be the key to automate the tracking and 
reconstruction of both external and inside attacks since the fingerprints defined in 
the evidences trees can provide contextual information to guide the forensic 
investigation of corresponding attacks. Take Attack C for example. Once the 
system has identified that the explore.exe process is running and the system user 
CAPITAL-EE7B9F2$ is logged in, a privilege escalation attack alert should be 
issued. Now it is critical to determine how such an attack has been conducted and 
who has conducted it. Based on the evidence tree of Attack C (Figure 8), a sequence 
of operations including the opening of the file At1.job, the launch of the process 
cmd.exe,  and the launch of the process explore.exe are correlated with the system 
user CAPITAL-EE7B9F2, while the process at.exe is run by the regular user User. 
Therefore, the regular user User can be correlated with Attack C. However, when 
multiple users share the same system, there are many issues to be addressed in order 
to reconstruct the attack and correlate such an attack to a specific user.  If each user 
schedules a task in the system, then it will need to determine which scheduled task 
starts the command prompt (cmd.exe). This information can be identified with its 
corresponding scheduled job which can be found in “C:\WINDOWS\Tasks\Atx.job” 
(x represents the schedule creation sequence such that a smaller value of x means 
earlier creation of such job. Also, the creation sequence of Atx.job, timestamps of 
the at.exe process can be used together to link the job file to a specific user).  If two 
users create the same type of task, i.e., each start a instance of cmd.exe process, then 
it would be extremely difficult to correlate this attack to a specific user since the 
start of explore.exe process leaves no other information in the system. To correlate 
such an attack to a specific user under this situation, more contextual information 
is needed, for example, the operations the attacker will do after the user obtained 
the system user’s privilege.  
Overall, even though sensitive operations of an attack can be used as the identity of 
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an attack, the fingerprints left in the system alone may not be sufficient to 
reconstruct the corresponding attack without the help of other contextual 
information. In a computer system, commands executed in a command prompt are 
usually not recorded, therefore, what the attacker has exactly done to system 
remains unknown to investigators. Also, sensitive system operations are usually 
executed by the system user instead of a regular user, therefore, there is a missing 
link between the regular user’s (the insider) activities and the system operations. 
Hence, other contextual information is needed to successfully reconstruct the 
attack, and such information is exactly what evidence trees can provide to 
investigators. Taking Attack C for example, once the chain linking operations of 
the launch of the at.exe process, the opening of the file Atx.job, the start of the 
process cmd.exe, and the start of the process explorere.exe is established, then 
Attack C can be successfully identified, tracked, and reconstructed automatically. 
 
6.  RELATED WORK 
Forensics readiness has recently been a big research concern in digital forensic 
investigation and information assurance (Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Endicott-
Popovsky et al., 2007; Rowlinson, 2004; Tan, 2001; Tang & Daniels, 2005; Wilson 
& Wolfe, 2003; Yasinsac & Manzano, 2001).  Existing research efforts focus on 
organization-level framework design such as policy or management. None of them 
has addressed the details of the technology part of forensics readiness, e.g. 
mechanisms of the application and system event logging, fingerprint storage and 
archiving, and evidence-handling procedures.  In this research, a formal forensics 
investigation is conducted for each category of frauds and intrusions against a 
honeynet simulating an online business information system. The research will 
allow security and digital forensics professionals to fully understand what 
fingerprints are available, what fingerprints are necessary but not available based 
on current settings, how to log  the needed fingerprints, how long fingerprints 
should be preserved in logs, and the detailed procedures to appropriately handle 
evidences. 
Honeynet has recently been applied to the fields of cyber security protection and 
network forensic investigation (Chen, Laih, Pouget, & Dacier, 2005; Khattab, 
Melhem, Mosse, & Znati, 2006; Krasser, Grizzard, & Owen, 2005; Levine, 
Grizzard, & Owen, 2004; Levine, Labella, Owen, Contis, & Culver, 2003; Spitzner, 
2003a, 2003b; Todtmann, Riebach, & Rathgeb, 2007; Watson, 2007), due to its 
cost-effectiveness for information assurance education and research. Honeynet is 
sometimes deployed along with the target information system to divert attacks 
(Watson, 2007). It can also be deployed as a standalone system to improve 
employee’s security awareness (Krasser et al., 2005; Levine et al., 2003; Levine et 
al., 2004),  mitigate the impact of attacks (Khattab et al., 2006), provide early 
response to external attacks (Todtmann et al., 2007), obtain statistical data for attack 
analysis (Chen et al., 2005), understand the general mechanisms of attacks (Chen 
et al., 2005; Pouget & Dacier, 2004), and help to detect insider threat (Spitzner, 
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2003a). A different approach is taken to apply the honeynet technology in this 
research. Instead of using a honeynet to attract external intrusions, attacks and 
fraudulent activities are performed on the honeynet to simulate both external 
intrusions and internal attacks against online businesses. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a systematic approach is proposed to develop the forensics readiness 
to fight against attacks and frauds that are committed to online business information 
systems. The approach mainly focuses on identifying, locating, and modeling 
evidences for external and internal attacks. Threat models are developed for the 
online business information systems using attack trees, and then these threat models 
are mapped to augmented attack trees by including individual attack operations.  A 
total of six modeled attacks, two external DoS attacks, two Case One internal 
attacks, and two Case Two internal attacks are conducted against a honeynet that 
simulates an online business information system. Forensics investigations are 
conducted immediately after each attack is committed, and fingerprints are then 
identified, collected, and mapped to an evidence tree.   
The resulted evidence trees can provide essential information for attack 
investigation, by answering at least the following three key questions: what 
information is relevant to the attack studied, where related fingerprint items can be 
located, and what information each piece of fingerprint can indicate. An evidence 
tree provides a mechanism to correlate attack operations with the fingerprints they 
produce, which can provide guidance in manual forensic investigation and provide 
the contextual information that is needed for the automation of attack tracking and 
reconstruction. 
Future efforts will involve the analysis of additional avenues of attacks against the 
online business information system in order to gain a complete view of valuable 
evidence identification, locating, and logging mechanisms. The eventual goal is to 
develop a systematic mechanism to automate the attack tracking and reconstructing 
in online business environments. 
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